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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BRIAN RAY KARSTEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050301-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on two counts of 
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine and 
cocaine) and one count of driving with a measurable controlled 
substance in the body (R. 58-59). This court has jurisdiction 
over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(West 
2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the officer have reasonable suspicion to stop 
defendant after he observed a clear statutory equipment 
violation? 
2. In the course of a stop initiated for a statutory 
equipment violation, did the officer have reasonable suspicion to 
frisk defendant after the officer observed two knives in 
defendant's vehicle, one of which was described as "an assault 
type weapon," and was concerned that defendant might have yet 
another weapon on his person? 
A non-deferential, correctness standard applies to appellate 
review of the reasonableness of traffic stops and Terry frisks. 
State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, 1 15, 103 P.3d 699; State v. Warren, 
2003 UT 36, f 12, 78 P.3d 590. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-140(2) (West 2004), governing display 
of red or blue lights, provides: 
(2) Except as required in Sections 41-6-132 
and 41-6-140.10, a person may not drive or 
move any vehicle or equipment upon any 
highway with any lamp cr device capable of 
displaying a red or blue light visible from 
directly in front of the center of the 
vehicle. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-16 (West 2004), granting peace officers 
the authority to frisk suspects for dangerous weapons, provides: 
A peace officer who has stopped a person 
temporarily for questioning may frisk the 
person for a dangerous weapon if he 
reasonably believes he or any other person is 
in danger. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with four criminal counts: possession 
of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third degree 
felony; possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), a third 
degree felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor; and driving with a measurable controlled substance 
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in the blood, a class B misdemeanor (R. 1-2). Defendant filed a 
motion to suppress, which the trial court denied after an 
evidentiary hearing (R. 17-22, 62). Defendant then entered a 
conditional guilty plea to two counts of possession of a 
controlled substance, one a third degree felony and the other a 
class A misdemeanor; and one count of driving with a measurable 
controlled substance in the blood, a class B misdemeanor (R. 31-
38). The court ordered zero-to-five years in the Utah State 
Prison on the felony charge, one year in the county jail on the 
class A misdemeanor, and six months in the county jail on the 
class B misdemeanor, as well as a fine of $1555 (R. 58). The 
court stayed incarceration, ordered probation for 36 months, and 
imposed multiple conditions, including sixty days in the county 
jail (R- 59). Defendant filed a motion for certificate of 
probable cause, which the court denied (R. 53-55, 65). Defendant 
also filed a notice of appeal (R. 50). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On a late July evening, Officer Taylor of the Utah Highway 
Patrol stopped a red GTO as it drove into Bluff, Utah (R. 62: 4, 
11). Officer Taylor testified that he stopped the vehicle 
because of an equipment violation, specifically two blue lights 
facing forward above the license plate area, a violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-140(2) (Id. at 5). Defendant described the blue 
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lights as "accent'" lights in the shape of skulls with "little 
eyeballs" that apparently lit up (R. 62: 21).1 
The officer approached the vehicle and noticed a knife on 
the floor in the backseat area behind the driver (Id. at 7, 14). 
He also observed that "[b]asically the inside of this car had no 
interior. It just had metal. You could see the roof. . . . it's 
like he's restoring [the car]" (Id. at 6, 16). 
Officer Taylor made contact with the driver, explained the 
violation, and asked for license, registration, and proof of 
insurance. Noticing a problem with the insurance card, the 
officer requested another one (Id. at 5). Defendant had his 
paperwork "wedged in where the sheet metal is" in the visor area 
of the roof right above his head (Id. at 6, 7). As defendant 
moved toward this area, the officer also saw a large knife, which 
he later described as "an assault type weapon," concealed in the 
same place (Id. at 5-6, 10). At that point, the officer decided 
to remove defendant from his vehicle (Id. at 6). 
While the officer was doing this, he spoke briefly with 
another officer who was present. He told the other officer that 
he could see a knife (Id. at 6-7). The other officer responded 
that he could also see a knife (Id. at 7). Given where each 
officer was standing, Officer Taylor assumed they were seeing two 
different knives (Id.). 
1
 Defendant acknowledged that the lights came with a 
warning stating that their use on vehicles might be illegal (Id. 
at 23) . 
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Once defendant was out of his car, Officer Taylor frisked 
him. He testified, n(W)here there were so many other knifes 
[sic], I decided to Terry frisk him to be sure there were no 
other knifes on the subject'' (Id. ) . Of the pat-down, Officer 
Taylor stated, "I immediately upon touching his left front 
pocket, I recognized what was consistent with a drug pipe . . . 
with a bowl on it" (Id.). He said he knew what the object was as 
soon as he touched it (Id. at 8). Officer Taylor handcuffed 
defendant and removed the pipe from his pocket (Id.). 
After giving defendant a Miranda warning, the officer 
removed a small bottle containing cocaine and a small tin box 
containing methamphetamine from defendant's front pocket (Id. at 
8-9) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the officer did not have reasonable 
suspicion to stop him because the statute he was accused of 
violating was not intended to cover the kind of lights he was 
displaying and because the stop was for an equipment, rather than 
a safety violation. Both of these arguments lack merit. First, 
by its plain language, the statute includes "any" lights 
displayed on the front of the car, which would clearly include 
the blue skull lights defendant had over his front license plate. 
Second, equipment violations are traffic violations and, as such, 
they justify investigative stops by law enforcement. 
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Defendant also argues that the officer lacked reasonable 
suspicion to frisk him. He argues that although he had two 
knives visible in his car, the fact that he cooperated with the 
officer by getting out of the car mitigated any danger he might 
otherwise have posed. Under the totality of the circumstances, 
however, the officer reasonably inferred that someone who kept an 
assault-type weapon within arm's reach in his vehicle might also 
be concerned enough about his personal safety to carry an 
additional weapon on his person. Because the officer's personal 
observations gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that defendant 
could be armed and dangerous, the officer was justified in 
conducting a Terry frisk. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE OFFICER HAD REASONABLE 
SUSPICION TO STOP DEFENDANT AFTER 
HE OBSERVED A CLEAR STATUTORY 
EQUIPMENT VIOLATION 
Defendant argues that a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
140(2) (West 2004) does not give rise to reasonable suspicion to 
stop a vehicle for two reasons: first, the statute "was not 
intended to cover small decorative lights on license plate 
holders, although such lights may technically fall within the 
statutory prohibition;" and, second, this was merely an equipment 
violation, not a safety violation (Br. of Aplt. at 5-7). 
Defendant's arguments are unavailing. First, the law is 
well-settled that "[w]here statutory language is plain and 
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unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond the same to divine 
legislative intent. Rather, we are guided by the rule that a 
statute should generally be construed according to its plain 
language." Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 
1989)(citation omitted); accord State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312 
(Utah 1995) (M>The best evidence of the true intent and purpose of 
the Legislature in enacting the Act is the plain language of the 
Act.'" (citation omitted)); Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 
850 n.14 (Utah 1994)(explaining statutory language is the first 
source of statutory interpretation). Where statutory language is 
plain, appellate courts will look no further. >x AWhen language is 
clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, 
and no room is left for construction.'" State v. Hardy, 2002 UT 
App 244, f 10, 54 P.3d 645 (citation omitted). 
The statutory language in this case could not be more clear: 
(2) Except as required in Sections 41-6-132 
and 41-6-140.10, a person may not drive or 
move any vehicle or equipment upon any 
highway with any lamp or device capable of 
displaying a red or blue light visible from 
directly in front of the center of the 
vehicle. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-140(2) (emphasis added) [2] . The use of the 
word "any" before the phrase "lamp or device. . ." unambiguously 
includes all possible lights, not just those that could be 
confused with the lights referenced in sections 41-6-132 and 41-
2
 These sections govern use of red and blue emergency 
lights and flashing red lights on school busses. 
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6-140.10. If the legislature had intended a more limited 
category of lights to be proscribed, it would not have used the 
word "any" to modify the phrase "lamp or device." No resort to 
statutory intent, therefore, is necessary to interpret the 
statute. The blue skull lights displayed by defendant in front 
of his license plate constituted a clear violation of the plain 
language of section § 41-6-140(2), thus giving rise to reasonable 
suspicion to stop his vehicle. 
Second, the fact that the display of blue lights constituted 
an equipment violation rather than a safety violation does 
nothing to defeat reasonable suspicion. vv [A] s long as an officer 
suspects that the Mriver is violating any one of the multitude 
of applicable traffic and equipment regulations,' the police 
officer may legally stop the vehicle." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 
1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
661 (1979)); see also State v. Spurqeon, 904 P.2d 220, 225 (Utah 
App. 1995)(providing that equipment violations are traffic 
violations justifying investigative stop by law enforcement). 
The distinction defendant seeks to draw between safety and 
equipment violations has no basis in the law. 
The trial court ruled: "I'm confident there was a violation 
observed of 41-6-140 subparagraph (2). It may not be the most 
momentous problem in the code, but still I think it's within the 
legitimate authority of the legislature to prohibit those kinds 
of lights. So he had the right to stop him" (R. 62: 31 at 
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addendum A). Because the trial court's ruling comports with 
unequivocal case law, defendant's claim fails. 
POINT TWO 
THE OFFICER HAD REASONABLE 
SUSPICION TO FRISK WHERE HE 
OBSERVED TWO KNIVES IN DEFENDANT'S 
VEHICLE, ONE OF WHICH WAS "AN 
ASSAULT TYPE WEAPON/' AND WAS 
CONCERNED THAT DEFENDANT MIGHT HAVE 
YET ANOTHER WEAPON ON HIS PERSON 
Defendant argues that although the officer had reasonable 
suspicion to believe that defendant was armed when he was in the 
vehicle, once defendant complied with the officer's request and 
got out of the vehicle, he was separated from his weapons, thus 
mitigating any danger to the officer. See Br. of Aplt. at 9-11. 
Consequently, defendant contends, the officer did not have 
reasonable suspicion to frisk him. 
The trial court disagreed, determining that the officer had 
reasonable suspicion to frisk defendant: 
You can't say when somebody's out of the car 
that if they've got a weapon on their person 
that they can't get to that. They certainly 
can. . . 
To me, given that you'd already seen two 
knifes [sic], it was reasonable to be 
concerned that this individual had another 
knife, that should he choose to resist the 
police, might be used by him for that 
purpose. In a place like Bluff, on the 
outskirts of Bluff, you wouldn't count on 
there being any public notice or to dissuade 
that individual [ s i c ] . . . . 
I think it would be a terrible mistake and 
expose law officers to unwarranted danger to 
prohibit them from frisking under these 
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circumstances. He's seen two knifes [sic] in 
the vehicle. I think he has the right to 
check to make sure this individual doesn't 
have another one in his pocket. 
R. 62: 32-33 at addendum A. 
The trial court ruling is correct. Both statutory and case 
law make clear that an officer may conduct a weapons frisk of an 
individual who has been properly stopped if the officer 
reasonably believes that he or anyone else is in danger. See, 
e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); State v. Carter, 707 
P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985); Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-16 (West 2004). 
"The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual 
is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the 
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or 
that of others was in danger." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; accord 
State v. Rovbal, 716 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1986). The officer's 
reasonable belief must, of course, be supported by "specific and 
articulable facts" as well as the "rational inferences" that may 
be drawn from those facts. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. "Since no one 
factor is determinative of reasonableness, a trial judge must 
determine the reasonableness of a frisk in light of all the 
facts." Carter, 707 P.2d at 659; accord State v. Humphrey, 937 
P.2d 137, 141 (Utah App. 1997) (articulating totality of the 
circumstances test). 
Here, the officer observed one knife on the floor in the 
backseat area of the car and another within the driver's reach 
(R. 62: 5-6, 10). Of the knife accessible by the driver, the 
-10-
officer testified, "I've never seen a knife like this, other than 
it looks like to me an assault type weapon. It's meant to be 
gripped, and I've never seen a weapon — a knife like that in a 
concealment place where it was. All I could figure it was for 
was to ward off someone, more of an assault type weapon" (Id. at 
10) . 
Having seen two knives, the officer sought to separate 
defendant from these weapons and to ensure he had no others (Id. 
at 7). While defendant was wholly cooperative with the officer 
when asked to get out of the car, defendant's compliance did 
nothing to diminish the officer's concern for his personal 
safety. In essence, the officer fairly inferred that someone who 
kept an assault-type weapon within arm's reach in his vehicle 
might be concerned enough about his personal safety to carry 
another dangerous weapon on his person. This inference was 
rational in light of the unusually dangerous character of the 
knife and its storage in such close proximity to defendant. 
Because the officer reasonably believed that defendant might be 
able to obtain control over another weapon and thus present a 
danger to him, the officer conducted a protective frisk. No more 
is necessary to support a Terry frisk. See State v. Brake, 103 
P.3d 699, 1 32. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction on two counts of possession of a controlled substance, 
one a third degree felony and the other a class A misdemeanor, 
and one count of driving with a measurable controlled substance 
in the blood, a class B misdemeanor. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this S day of October, 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing brief of appellee were mailed first-class, postage 
prepaid, to Aric Cramer, Cramer & Cramer, Smith Hyatt Building, 
845 South Main Street, Suite 23, Bountiful, Utah 84010, this 3^ 
day of October, 2005. 
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Addendum A 
Addendum A 
-31-
1 five minutes, but I think that that's the analysis. 
2 THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
3 MR. CRAMER: Thank you, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Halls, I'm going to give you a chance 
5 to put anything on the record that you think needs to be on the 
6 record, but I know what I should do here. I'm going to deny 
7 the motion to suppress. 
8 I I have read what I think are the operative, pertinent 
9 portions in each of the four cases that Mr. Cramer has given 
10 me; State vs. Galvin, 37 P.3d 1197; State vs. Brake, which is 
11 2004 Utah 95; State vs. Hechtle, 89 P.3d 185; State vs. Warren, 
12 78 P.3d 590. 
13 I think the initial stop was proper. Seems like 
14 therewas a violation — I'm confident there was a violation 
15 observed of 41-6-140 subparagraph (2). It may not be the most 
16 momentous problem in the code, but still I think it's within 
17 the legitimate authority of the legislature to prohibit those 
18 kinds of lights. So he had the right to stop him. 
19 Having observed two knifes, and the one knife I saw is 
20 more than a pocketknife, creates considerably more concern than 
21 a pocketknife. This is not a case, like some of the cases that 
22 were cited, where we're talking about going back and searching 
23 a vehicle after removing the occupant from the vehicle. 
24 This is a case where we're just talking about frisking 
25 the occupant, and I think that's a case where there's less 
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1 impact. It's more focused on the real risk. You can't say 
2 when somebody's out of the car that if they've got a weapon on 
3 their person that they can't get to that. They certainly can. 
4 To me, given that you'd already seen two knifes, it 
5 was reasonable to be concerned that this individual had another 
6 knife, that should he choose to resist the police, might be 
7 used by him for that purpose. In a place like Bluff, on the 
I \ 
8 outskirts of Bluff, you wouldn't count on there being any 
9 public notice or to dissuade that individual. 
10 Now, this is a difficult area, I think, for the 
11 Courts, because I think they're reluctant to say everybody 
12 you stop, you can frisk. Yet if you have to be 50 percent 
13 certain, there has to be a 50/50 chance this guy's going to 
14 pull a knife on you and stab you before you can actually check 
15 for it, then we're going to lose 50 percent of the officers in 
16 these circumstances. 
17 I don't think that's the standard. I think ib has 
18 to be a standard that allows officers to protect themselves 
19 at lower levels of risk than that. So I haven't seen a case 
20 specifically on point. 
21 I suppose — well, I know that I'll be subject to 
22 correction if I'm wrong about this, but I think it would be a 
23 terrible mistake and expose law officers to unwarranted danger 
24 to prohibit them from frisking under these circumstances. He's 
25 seen two knifes in the vehicle. I think he has the right to 
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1 check to make sure this individual doesn't have another one in 
2 his pocket. I hope he would. If it were anyone that I care 
3 about who's a law enforcement officer, I would desperately hope 
4 that he can do that for his own safety, or her own safety. 
5 MR. HALLS: Your Honor, just — 
6 THE COURT: You can put on the record what you want to, 
7 in case, you know, there would be any question about whether 
8 you made an argument or not, Mr. Halls. 
9 I MR. HALLS: Two other minor things for the record would 
10 be, your Honor, that the actual character of the knife, the 
11 officer said he recognized it as being more of an assault knife 
12 than any kind of utility knife, or functional or any other kind 
13 of a — 
14 THE COURT: Looks kind of like a small cling on knife. 
15 MR. HALLS: It has like a brass knuckle component to 
16 it, and it's got serrated edge on the top and it's sharp on 
17 the bottom. So he said he noticed that about the knife as it 
18 was there. 
19 The second thing he noticed before he did the — 
2 0 another thing that he noticed before doing the frisk was the 
21 other officer said — he said, "I can see a knife,'' and got him 
22 out. The other officer said, "I can also see knifes." 
23 So there were another indication from the other 
24 officer there were other knifes that could be seen, besides 
25 the one that he was observing. I think that gives another 
